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Toward a Moral Education Theory of Childhood Punishment
Hamilton Garber
Abstract:
This paper serves as a defense of the application of moral education theory to childhood
punishments and includes a recommendation for proper punishment based on a Razian
conception of autonomy. Punishment on this account can and should infringe upon autonomy,
but it must do so according to certain restraints. Accordingly, this paper includes a test to
determine whether a punishment is permissible. The moral education theory can be justified
through its aptitude at producing moral adults who follow moral rules by their own volition,
however, morally educative punishments will likely produce other side benefits such as
deterrence as well.
Introduction:
The punishing of wrongdoers is certainly one of the most widely shared and thoroughly
endorsed social institutions. While different cultures punish differently, all societies impose
sanctions on those who have violated norms. Punishment has been and continues to be a crucial
instrument of child-rearing and a practical means of firmly establishing normative values.
Parents often coercively and intentionally frustrate the wills of their children in order to instill a
healthy growth in appreciation of values and to promote a comfortable transition into their own
autonomous action once they have matured (Morris 266, Mullin 414).
Because this practice is both normalized and historically universal, it is often overlooked
that the punishing of children requires both a justification and a positive framework of
permissible punishment that fixes appropriate upper and lower bounds of the extent and severity
of punishment. While abolitionists of punishment might argue that there exists no sufficient
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justification for punishment or no valid circumstances in which punishment is warranted, other
positive philosophies have ventured to provide theories of just punishment which are generally
informed by a broad moral framework. These justifying philosophies have produced interesting
results in their normative content for adults and children alike, yet each has unavoidable
drawbacks.
Traditional theories include the broadly consequentialist deterrence, incapacitation, and
rehabilitation theories, and the broadly deontological retributivism. These competitive theories
have developed greatly and have incorporated great nuance, yet there has been no clear synthesis
to solve the intractable debate. Unionist theories of punishment attempt such a synthesis through
incorporating select features of the traditional rival theories to preserve the desirable aspects and
avoid the downsides. One such unionist theory is moral education theory, and it is the aim of this
paper to develop the promising particularities of punishment as moral education for children and
to defend this theory against some glaring difficulties. The precise variety of moral education
theory that I will be defending will attempt to incorporate the effective deterrence that is
emphasized in deterrence theory, the restoration of justice that is emphasized in retributivism,
and the positive psychological development at which rehabilitation theory aims. However, I must
emphasize that any deterrent, retributive, or rehabilitative consequences occurring from moral
education are merely adjacent benefits. The singular justifying aim of moral education theory is
to cultivate moral individuals who act rightly of their own accord.
A Sketch of Moral Education Theory:
As Jean Hampton emphasizes, punishment as moral education has a long history in
philosophy from antiquity through the Enlightenment and into the present (208). A main
advantage of the theory is that it purports to benefit the offender through punishing. The idea that
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punishment ought to confer a benefit to the wrongdoer reaches back to Plato. In his dialogue
Gorgias, Plato likens punishment to medicine in that receiving due punishment restores the soul
to its just condition by removing injustice in the same way that medicine restores the body to
health by removing sickness (820-821). In his Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Hegel
concurs that punishment is a metaphysical good for the offender in that their wrong action is an
implicit notion that they have violated a universal law as a rational being and therefore must have
the wrong negated by an equivalent deprivation to return themself to a just condition (126).
While Plato and Hegel give a weight to the unintuitive claim that punishment confers a benefit to
the offender through historical precedent, modern thinkers endorse this premise through different
methods.
Morally educative punishment as moral communication is particularly apt for
relationships between parents, teachers, and other guardians and children. Here, a paternalistic
relationship is already assumed, where such a relationship might be more problematic in an
adult-to-adult relationship. Additionally, it is unclear that moral education will effectively
cultivate an autonomous moral agency in an adult whose conceptions of right and wrong might
be from ignorance yet sufficiently ossified such that a moral communication does not them. For
these reasons, I will remain agnostic as to the potential of moral education theory functioning as
a justified theory of punishment for adults.
Herbert Morris and Jean Hampton are more recent proponents of the moral education
theory of punishment. Morris claims that a morally educative justification of punishment is a
paternalistic theory of punishment. A paternalistic theory for Morris in this context means that
punishment confers a benefit to the offender while limiting their will (Morris 264, Shafer-Landau
189). Morris and Hampton differ about the nature of the goods that paternalism confers and what
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it means for the will to be limited. Morris believes that the good conferred by punishment is
moral education and also the retribution achieved through punishment in a roughly Hegelian
sense as mentioned in the above paragraphs (Morris 264, Shafer-Landau 190). For Morris, the
will that is limited by the paternalistic authority seems to mean the offender’s liberty to do as
they please (Morris 270). Hampton believes that punishment is justified solely by the conferred
good of moral education (Hampton 232). The will that is limited on Hampton’s account seems to
be both a limit imposed on the liberty to do as one pleases but also a limit imposed on one’s
autonomy (Hampton 222, 224). This distinction of will as autonomy or liberty will prove
problematic later, however for my purposes I use Hampton’s conception of the limit of the will
as an infringement on both the freedom and autonomy of the punished.

I take Hampton’s account that punishment for children can be justified solely through the
benefit of moral education conferred to the punished. In its application for the punishing of
children, that benefit is the promotion of the growth of the child into a moral adult that is
autonomously attached to the good. Through moral education, the child will come to develop
moral sensibilities which will persist throughout childhood into maturity. As the child matures
and begins to act autonomously, the attachment to the good instilled by morally educative
punishment will persist and become all the more intelligible and reasonable. The moral education
theory might still be viewed as a union between other justifying theories through number of
attendant benefits other than this development of an attachment to the good. A retributive
negation of the wrong can be seen as an adjacent benefit along with the likely deterrence that
painful punishment will affect. Children might be deterred from knowingly doing wrong if they
can reasonably expect a punishment, and anyone wronged by the child’s actions might be
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retributively negated, but these side benefits need not do any of the justifying work that is
necessary for a just theory of punishment.
I endorse Hampton and Morris’s shared conception of punishment as a moral
communication both as a message to the punished and to society at large (Hampton 215, Morris
264). While punishment is often viewed as a coercive and violent act, punishment as a moral
communication is a rather intuitive view upon reflection. A common phrase given after a parent
or guardian punishes a child is “I hope you have learned your lesson.” This phrase implies that
through punishment, one teaches a lesson, or in other words, morally educates. The child must be
made aware of the extent and gravity of the harm that they have brought to another (Hampton
218, Morris 264). Hampton makes a helpful metaphor for the role of morally educative
punishment which compares punishment to electric fences around behavior. In the same way that
livestock can learn the boundaries of the pen in which they are enclosed through a few painful
shocks, humans will learn the boundaries of permissible behavior through a few painful
punishments. However, there is an important difference between the learning of humans and the
learning of livestock: the livestock may only learn that there are boundaries and where they
might lie, whereas humans can not only learn where boundaries are but also why they are there.
On both the account of Morris and Hampton, the punishing authority must convey to the child
through the punishment itself not only that the act was wrong but also substantively why the act
was wrong (Hampton 212, Morris 264).
Features of Autonomy:
A key limiting feature of the moral education theory is the commitment to autonomy. I
agree that this commitment to autonomy is crucial for developing children into proper
autonomous moral citizens. This feature distinguishes moral education from deterrence. While
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punishment can be an effective deterrent, parents and guardians cannot reasonably expect to
provide the threat necessary for effective deterrence all the time. For this reason, autonomous
attachment to the good better ensures right action. Hampton and Morris both place great
emphasis on respect for autonomy in their positive guidelines of punishment, yet unhelpfully,
neither provides a clear conception of what is meant by autonomy (Shafer-Landau 195). I will
outline in this section a particular conception of autonomy that is both reasonably defensible and
functional in my positive theory of punishment. In his book, The Morality of Freedom, Joseph
Raz provides three conditions that are necessary and sufficient for autonomy: “appropriate
mental abilities, an adequate range of options, and independence” (372). I will be using Raz’s
tripartite conception of autonomy in this defense of moral education theory.
The first component is mental ability for autonomy, which I will refer to from now on as
capacity for autonomy. The relevant mental ability necessary for autonomy is a capacity for
choice. In order for life to be an uncoerced and thereby an autonomous life, one must be capable
of being aware of one’s options, capable of being aware that one’s life extends through time
where decisions made in the present will lead to future outcomes, and capable of setting personal
values (Raz 372, 385). These components of the capacity of choice can be condensed into the
ability to form a sufficiently complex plan of action.
Next, in order for autonomy to obtain, one must have access to an adequate range of
options. Options are choice-worthy courses of actions that enable the actualization of some
inherent human capacity (Raz 373). Options are choice-worthy insofar as they are sufficiently
meaningful but not fatalistic choices. Raz also proposes a “test of variety” in order to determine
whether the range of options is adequate for autonomy (Raz 375). In order to pass the test, four
kinds of options are needed which each actualize a different inherent human capacity: physical
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options, imaginative options, affective options, and cognitive options (Zwartheod 219). This test
of variety is not to be confused with complete self-actualization itself, as true autonomy enables
an agent to either choose or reject each self-actualizing option.
Raz’s test of variety can be interpreted in one of two ways: the sufficient development
interpretation or the full development interpretation. On the former interpretation, a range of
options passes the test if the options allow the agent to actualize their capacities to a sufficient
degree. The latter interpretation would suggest that a range of options passes the test if the
options allow the agent to actualize their capacities to the fullest extent (Zwartheod 219). In
order to defend the moral education theory, it is necessary to interpret Raz on the sufficient
development interpretation for reasons that will be discussed later.
Independence is the final condition of Raz’s conception of autonomy. Quite simply,
independence is freedom from external coercion (377).
Two Challenges of Autonomy to the Moral Education Theory for Children:
An obvious worry about the conception of autonomy that I defend in this paper is
whether and when children can be said to be autonomous. Clearly, very young children are not
able to form a plan of action that is sufficiently complex to demonstrate a sufficiently developed
faculty of choice. However, at some point, parents should begin to hold their children
responsible for their actions and accordingly being to punish wrong actions. It must then be
demonstrated when, if ever, it is right for authorities to begin morally educative punishments for
children.
I argue that each individual component of Raz’s conception of autonomy can admit of
degrees except for independence. As a child matures, she will develop the ability to formulate
more and more complex plans of action, therefore her capacity for choice is developing in
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degrees. This child at three years old will probably be able only to form the rudiments of an
action plan by setting a basic goal and a singular and simple means of achieving it. At seven, she
might be able to both set more complex, multi-stage goals and might be aware of multiple
different courses of action to achieve her goals. Once a child is able to formulate a plan of this
sort and they demonstrate a capacity for understanding that the actions that they take can cause
harm to others, then it is time to begin administering morally educative punishment. A full
psychological account of benchmarks and a range of appropriate ages where these conditions
might be met are outside the scope of this paper and will require further development in future
work. Discipline before a child meets these requirements ought to be deterrence focused for the
safety of the child and others who they may harm. An account of this sort of deterrence is
similarly outside the scope of this paper.
Similarly, access to options admits of degrees. Paternalism, in my estimation, entails a
strong amount of control exercised by the parent (or equivalent authority) in administering
access to relevant options to their children. This acceptance of paternalism does not entail that
the child will have no access to meaningful options made available from her own devices.
However, many meaningful options will need to be provided by the authority to pass Raz’s test
of variety.
Independence, as Raz characterizes it, does not admit of the same degree as capacity or
access to options. Independence here is not an internal characteristic of a child, as this quality
would be classified under a capacity for autonomy. Rather, independence is simply freedom
from external coercion. A child will either be coerced or uncoerced with respect to their actions,
meaning this component of autonomy is simple a binary. The independence condition of
autonomy will never be met in a paternalistic punishment context as punishments will be
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administered non-optionally. Practically, this entails a distinct feature of my account of morally
educative punishment: that punishment necessarily infringes on autonomy.
A second worry comes from the problem of respecting autonomy when punishing. As
mentioned above, moral education theory is a paternalistic theory of punishment which involves
conferring the benefit of the development of moral autonomy onto the offender while limiting
their will. This prompts the dilemma of whether punishment can rightfully infringe upon
autonomy. If punishment can rightfully infringe upon autonomy, then it must be explicit what
kinds of infringements and the extent to which infringements are licit. Hampton conceives the
limiting of the will as a permissible infringement on autonomy, yet her positive explanation of
punishment fails to explicitly detail the extent or quality of licit punishments (Hampton 232,
Shafer-Landau 195). Morris, who conceives of the limiting of the will as a limit on liberty to do
as one pleases rather than autonomy, conceives of autonomy as an absolute right that is never to
be infringed (Morris 270, Shafer-Landau 196). Thus, Morris endorses the negative horn of this
dilemma, where autonomy is never permissibly infringed. Morris fails to explain both why
autonomy is an absolute right and how one can punish without infringing on autonomy. Because
my account of punishment necessarily infringes upon the independence condition of autonomy, I
cannot accept Morris’s position. Rather, in this defense of the moral education theory I will
affirm Hampton’s judgment that punishment can permissibly infringe upon autonomy in a
number of licit ways.
A Positive Moral Educationist Theory of Punishment:
Punishing in a morally educative way permits a particular kind of coercive punishment. A
proper punishment includes infringing on the child’s freedom to do as they please as well as
removing access to choice-worthy options. Part of this punishment includes the explicit verbal
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communication of the message to the child that meets all of the requirements for moral
education. To reiterate, these include a reminder that the action was wrong, the moral reason for
why the action was wrong, and finally an account of the extent of harm that was imparted onto
the people that were wronged by the action. Ideally, this moral message will be communicated
with other children around including those wronged that they may also learn the moral lesson.
The extent of the punishment ought not exceed the extent of the harm caused to others,
and ought to leave sufficient options in order that the child might still express a sufficient degree
of autonomy. For a sufficient range of options, there must be enough options to pass Raz’s test of
variety. A sufficient range will include at least one option for each of the capacities that Raz
enumerates: physical, imaginative, affective, and cognitive. The punishment may never involve
infringing upon the child’s capacity for autonomy or the development thereof. For this reason,
any sort of corporal punishment is ruled out as empirical psychological evidence suggests this
deteriorates a child’s sense of self-worth and, thus, their ability for self-rule (Gershoff et al. 231).
Additionally, psychological or verbal abuse will likely cause a similar deteriorative effect, and
are similarly, thereby, ruled out.
I will summarize my theory of proper punishment through a test for the permissibility of
punishment.
1. Does the punishment avoid corporal punishment or another form of abuse?
2. Does the punishment limit a choice-worthy option for the child?
3. Does the punishment leave sufficient options to pass the test of variety?
4. Does the punishment include a moral communication?
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A proper punishment needs an affirmative response in all four steps to be a licit
punishment. Any punishment that includes a negative response is, therefore, an illicit
punishment.
I will end my account of proper punishment by providing examples of illicit and licit
punishments. An illicit punishment might be a verbal tirade given by a teacher that rises to the
level of abuse as a punishment for a child who has cheated on a test. The authority who punishes
here cannot affirm the first question of my test and has, therefore, infringed upon the student’s
capacity for autonomy. Therefore, this punishment is illicit.
A proper punishment here would be for the teacher to reprimand in a restrained and
respectful manner in front of the class the student and explain that cheating on a test harms both
the student who cheats and the student who was cheated on as well as the teacher. The teacher
might require that the student stay after class to write an apology, thereby limiting the student’s
choice-worthy option of afterschool activity and their liberty to do as they please. In the context
of writing the letter, the student still ought to have the physical option to move around a
reasonable amount, the imaginative option of how to write the letter, the affective option of
talking with the teacher about their deed, and the cognitive option of thinking about why
cheating was wrong. This punishment would pass the test and is, therefore, a licit punishment.
Another example of an illicit punishment would be for a parent to lock their child in their
room for an entire evening after scolding the child for hitting their sibling. While this punishment
is not necessarily abuse, it limits choice-worthy options, and it includes a moral communication,
it fails to give a sufficient range of options to pass the test of variety. While a child is locked in
their room, they will have no meaningful affective or physical options. It is, therefore, an illicit
punishment
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A proper punishment here would be for the parent to ground the child for the night and
not allow them to engage in their desired pastime for the evening after reprimanding them for
their violence. This punishment does not constitute abuse, limits a choice-worthy option while
leaving sufficient options, and includes a moral communication. Therefore, this is a licit
punishment.
Conclusion:
Proper punishment that respects developing autonomy is a difficult, but not impossible
task. My moral education theory of punishment for children allows for a narrow range of
permissible punishments according to my test, yet if the punishing authority respects these
guidelines, this punishment will foster a lasting connection to the good that surpasses mere
deterrence. My recommendations for punishment also establish reasonable bounds that constitute
a punishment that is neither ineffective nor draconian, but rather fair and respectful. Over time,
morally educated punishments ought to become less frequent as the child develops autonomy
along with further respect for moral rules. Other means of moral education are also supplemental
to punishment including moral suasion and positive reinforcement of good behavior. However,
morally educative punishments remain a necessary tool for producing a moral adult.
Further issues to address in order for this theory to be properly implemented include a
more robust psychological account of the benchmarks of autonomy in children as well as
addressing what sorts of punishment is apt for children that are too young to be morally
educated.
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